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Labor and Employment Law
BARBARA

J.

FIcK*

The past year did not bring many major developments in the labor
and employment law field; it was mainly a year of refinements and
fine-tuning. The biggest news on the legislative front is the passage of
a statute prohibiting employment discrimination based on an employee's
off-duty use of tobacco.' In the judicial arena, the Indiana Supreme2
Court, in Bochnowski v. Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Association,
joined the majority trend in recognizing a cause of action for third
party intentional interference with at-will employment relationships. These
were the highlights of a relatively quiet year. Other legislative developments discussed below include amendments to education statutes regarding suspensions of teachers with and without pay, changes in payment
provisions under the unemployment and workers' compensation laws,
and amendments to the penalty provisions of the occupational health
and safety law. Among the judicial decisions reviewed in this Article
are cases revisiting the Frampton rule, addressing employee defamation
suits against employers, employment discrimination, issues arising in
public sector employment, wage statutes, unemployment compensation,
and workers' compensation.
I.

A.

LEGisLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Off-Duty Use of Tobacco

A new chapter was added to Title 22 of the Indiana Code dealing
with the off-duty use of tobacco by employees. Chapter 22-5-4 prohibits
an employer from requiring, as a condition of employment, that an
employee refrain from using tobacco products when not at work. 3 This
chapter also prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee with respect to compensation, benefits, and terms and conditions
of employment because an employee uses tobacco when not at work. 4
This statute does not prohibit employers from maintaining smoke-free
workplaces, limiting the work areas where smoking is allowed, or for*

Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Creighton University,

1972, B.A.; University of Pennsylvania, 1976, J.D.
1. IND. CODE §§ 22-5-4-1 to -4 (Supp. 1991).
2. 571 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1991). See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
3. IND. CODE § 22-5-4-1(1) (Supp. 1991).
4. Id. § 22-5-4-1(2).
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bidding employees from smoking while at work. The law is aimed solely
at off-duty conduct of employees.
Many employers, however, see a connection between some types of
employee off-duty conduct and employer profitability. A new trend in
health care cost containment among corporations is to offer financial
incentives to employees who adopt and maintain healthy lifestyles. 5 Many
of these financial incentive plans focus on smoking. For example, Minneapolis-based Control Data Corporation charges its employees who
smoke ten percent more for health insurance premiums than its nonsmoking employees. 6 Such a program would be illegal under the new
Indiana law since it would constitute discrimination in benefits because
an employee used tobacco products when not at work.
The new law allows employees to bring a civil action against employers to enforce its provisions.7 The statute authorizes courts to award
actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees to prevailing employees
and to enjoin further violations of the statute.8 The remedies provided
by this statute are not exclusive; employees retain any rights or remedies
provided by any other 'state or federal laws. 9 The statute exempts from
its application employers that are a church, a religious organization, or
a school or business conducted by a church or religious organization. 0
B.

Amendments to Indiana's Education Statutes

The legislaiure also amended a section of the Teacher Tenure Act
dealing with the cancellation of a permanent or semi-permanent teacher's
indefinite contract." The statute provided that, pending a decision on
the cancellation of a contract, a teacher could be suspended from duty,
but it was silent as to whether that teacher was entitled to continue
receiving a salary while suspended. 12 The amendment prohibits the governing body of the school corporation from withholding salary payments
and other employment benefits during the period of suspension., 3
A new section was added to the Indiana education code detailing
the procedures for suspending a teacher without pay when the procedures

5.
§ 4, at 1.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Laurie Cohen, Wanted Healthier Workers, CmCAO Ta xuNE, Jan. 6, 1992,
Id. at 2.
IND. CODE § 22-5-4-2(a) (Supp. 1991).
Id. § 22-5-4-2(b).
Id. § 22-5-4-3.

10. Id. § 22-5-4-4.
11. Id. § 20-6.1-4-11.
12. IND. CODE § 20.6.1-4-11(a)(8) (1988).
13. IND. CODE § 20-6.14-11(b) (Supp. 1991).
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for canceling the contract do not apply. 4 The statute lists five exclusive
reasons for which a teacher may be suspended without pay. 5 The reasons
listed are broad enough, however, to encompass a multitude of situations.
For example, a teacher may 6be suspended without pay for immorality
or for good and just cause.'
This new section also provides due process procedures which must
be followed to suspend a teacher without pay. 1 7 The teacher must be
notified in writing of the time, place, and date of the consideration by
the school corporation of the suspension and must be furnished, upon
request, a written statement of the reasons for the suspension. 18 The
teacher may file a written request for a hearing, where he is entitled
to a full statement of the reasons for the suspension and is entitled to
present testimony and evidence bearing on the reasons.' 9 The section
also provides when such a suspension may take effect 0 and allows the
governing body of the school corporation to suspend a teacher without
pay "for a reasonable time." '2' The section does not define, however,
what is a reasonable time.
C. Other Legislative Developments
House Enrolled Act No. 1594 amends several sections of the unemployment compensation statute, primarily providing for changes in
the fund ratio schedule and increasing the amount of claimant payments.
A new section also was added authorizing the administrative law judges
and review board to hold hearings by telephone under certain specified
conditions.22
House Enrolled Act No. 1517 contains numerous amendments to
the workers' compensation law, the majority of which provide for increases in the payment schedules for injuries and occupational diseases.
Additionally, two new provisions were added establishing time limits
within which an employer must begin temporary total or partial disability
payments or notify the workers' compensation board and the affected
employee that it is denying liability. 23 These provisions also specify the
14. Id. § 20-6.1-5-15.
15. Id. § 20-6.1-5-15(b). Section 15(b) expressly provides that the five listed reasons
are the only reasons for which a suspension without pay may occur.
16. IND. CODE § 20-6.1-5-15(b)(1), (5) (Supp. 1991).
17. Id. § 20-6.1-5-15(c).
18. Id. § 20-6.1-5-15(c)(1), (2).
19. Id. § 20-6.1-5-15(c)(3)-(6).
20. Id. § 20-6.1-5-15(c)(7).
21. Id. § 20-6.1-5-15(c)(8).
22. Id. § 224-17-8.5.
23. Id. § 22-3-3-7(b) (disabilities caused by injuries); id. § 22-3-7-16(a) (payments
on account of occupational disease).
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circumstances under which the employer may terminate such payments
once begun24 Another section was added to the workers' compensation
law requiring employers to post a notice at the workplace informing
employees that they are covered by workers' compensation insurance
and containing the name, address, and telephone number of the insurance
carrier. 2s
House Enrolled Act No. 1517 also amended the occupational health
and safety law by increasing the amount of the penalty assessed for
violations 26 and adding penalties for failure to comply with the posting
requirements 27 and for knowing violations of any standard, rule, or
2
order. 1
II. JuDiciAL DEEwLoPMENrs
A. Employment-at-Will
In Bochnowski v. Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Association, the
Indiana Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, the validity of a
claim for tortious interference with an employment relationship when
that relationship is based on a contract terminable at will. 29 Prior to
Bochnowski, Indiana courts refused to recognize such a cause of action.30
The courts had noted that to assert a successful claim for tortious
interference, the underlying contract right subject to the interference
must be enforceable. When the underlying contract is terminable at will,
the contracting parties do not have enforceable rights as to the duration
of the contract. The fact that third party interference caused the contract
to be terminated, therefore, did not give rise to a cause of action because
there was no enforceable
expectation as to the date when the contract
3
could be terminated. '
The Indiana Supreme Court, in rejecting this reasoning, joined the
majority of states which have recognized a cause of action for tortious
interference with an employment-at-will relationship.3 2 The court did not
disagree with the proposition that in a tortious interference action the
underlying contract right subject to interference must be enforceable.
24. Id. § 22-3-3-7(c) (payments on account of injuries); id. § 22-3-7-16(b) (payments
on account of occupational disease).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
1991).
30.
31.
32.

Id. § 22-3-2-22.
Id. § 22-8-1.1-27.1(a).
Id. § 22-8-1.1-27.1(a)(4).
Id. § 22-8-1.1-27.1(a)(6).
Bocknowski v. Peoples Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282 (Ind.
See Stanley v. Kelley, 422 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 667.
Bochnowski, 571 N.E.2d at 284.
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Rather, the court viewed the right being interfered with by the third
party in a slightly different light. First, it noted that "until a contract
terminable at will is terminated, it constitutes a valid and subsisting
agreement that is presumed to continue in effect. ' 33 Although not disputing the fact that the durational element of such a contract is unenforceable, the court observed that the right with which the third party
is interfering is the enforceable expectation that the decision regarding
duration will be made by the contracting parties and "not upon the
whim of a third party interferer.1 3 4 Thus, a claim for tortious interference
with an at-will employment relationship can be maintained. In concluding,
the court held that in order to be able to prevail on such a cause of
action, the plaintiff must be able to prove "that the defendant interferer
acted intentionally and without a legitimate business purpose." 35
The appellate court, in Stivers v. Stevens,36 revisited the Frampton
rule and expanded it to a closely related set of circumstances. In Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 37 the Indiana Supreme Court recognized a
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, allowing an
employee to sue her employer for retaliatory discharge for filing a
workers' compensation claim. 38 The court noted that refusing to recognize
such a cause of action would allow employers to coerce their employees
against asserting their rights under the workers' compensation
law, thereby
39
undermining the legislative purpose behind the law.
In Stivers, the employee alleged that she was discharged because she
told her employer she intended to file a workers' compensation claim.
The employer asserted that the holding of Frampton should be limited
to its specific facts, arguing that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed
because she was not fired for filing a claim, but only because she said
she would file a claim. The appellate court, rejecting the employer's
contention, looked to the reasoning underlying the Frampton decision.
Acknowledging that Frampton is a narrow exception to the employmentat-will rule, it noted that a reason for preventing employers from terminating employees who file workers' compensation claims is the "deleterious effect on the exercise of this important statutory right. The
discharge of an employee merely for suggesting she might file a claim
has an even stronger deleterious effect." 4°

33. Id.
34. Id. at 285.
35. Id.
36. 581 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
37. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
38. Id. at 428.
39. Id.
40. Slivers, 581 N.E.2d at 1254.
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The last two cases of interest in this area involve defamation suits
brought by employees against their employers. In Burks v. Rushmore,4'
the company medical director sent a memorandum to the secretary of
the company benefit committee, the assistant vice president of personnel,
and a company attorney involved in labor matters. The memorandum
questioned whether the plaintiff-employee had engaged in fraud because
he appeared to be actively managing a business while on disability leave
from the company.
The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment dismissing the complaint, finding that no publication had occurred. 4 2 The
plaintiff contended that since the company attorney had no responsibility
to act on the content of the memorandum, there was publication as to
him. The attorney had stated that he would not have acted on the
memorandum without talking to somebody about it first. The court
noted, however, that the company medical director had consulted in the
past with the attorney on different matters and that after sending the
memorandum, had consulted with the attorney concerning the plaintiff. 43
The court held that these facts showed that the attorney had some
managerial responsibility to act upon the matter and thus, was an
appropriate party to receive the memorandum. 44 No publication, therefore, had occurred.
The court also held that, even if there had been publication as to
the attorney, the relationship between the medical director and the
attorney met the requirements for a qualified privilege. 45 Because the
attorney had a responsibility to act upon the information provided when
consulted and the medical director had a duty to monitor the plaintiff's
disability, the memorandum concerned their corresponding duties on an
employment matter, was used for a proper purpose, and was sent to
persons who had legitimate reasons to receive it. Thus, the communication
was protected by a qualified privilege. 46
Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc.47 also concerned the scope
of the qualified privilege in the employment context. Chambers, who
had previously been employed by defendant American Trans Air, became
concerned that her ex-employer was giving bad references to prospective
employers, interfering with her ability to procure employment. She asked
her mother and boyfriend to telephone the defendant, ostensibly as

41.
42.
43.

569 N.E.2d 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 716.
Id. at 715.

44. Id.at 716.
45. Id. at 717.
46. Id. at 716-17.
47. 577 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
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prospective employers, and request a reference. Chambers alleged that
the statements made by the defendant during these telephone conversations were defamatory. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, holding that there had been no publication because the
mother and boyfriend were acting as agents of the plaintiff.
The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, but
on a different rationale. It considered whether the statements were
protected by a qualified privilege. 41 The court cited Prosser & Keeton,
Torts,49 for the general rule that "an employee reference given by a
former employer to a prospective employer is clothed with the mantle
of qualified privilege." 50 The court adopted this general rule as consistent
with existing Indiana law on the applicability of qualified privilege in
other circumstances and as serving a significant social interest in unrestricted communication on a matter in which the parties have a common
interest - the appraisal of an employee's qualifications for employment. 51
Having recognized the qualified privilege for employment references,
the court also specified that the communication could lose its privilege
upon a showing of abuse. 2 Such a showing could be made when: "(1)
[t]he communicator was primarily motivated by ill will in making the
statement; (2) there was excessive publication of the defamatory statement; or (3) the statement is made without belief or grounds for belief
in its truth." 53
B. Employment Discrimination
Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. Kightlinger & Gray 4 clarified
the scope of the term "employment" as used in the Indiana Civil Rights
Law, which prohibits certain types of discrimination "relating to employment." 55 A senior partner in a law firm was expelled from the firm,
allegedly due to his history of alcoholism. The attorney filed a complaint
with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission claiming handicap discrimination in employment. The firm filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
contending that a partner is not an employee and that discrimination
against a partner is not discrimination relating to employment. The
CommissioS denied the motion.

48. Id. at 615.
49. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON
(5th ed. 1984).
50. Chambers, 577 N.E.2d at 615.
51. Id. at 615-16.
52. Id.at 615.
53. Id.at 616.
54. 567 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
55. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(1) (1988).

ON TmE LAw OF TORTS,

§ 115,

at

827
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Subsequently, the firm filed a petition for judicial review and a
complaint for declaratory judgment with the superior court. The court
granted both summary and declaratory judgment, holding that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the complaint because a partnership
relationship does not fall within the meaning of the statutory
phrase
"relating to employment." The appellate court affirmed.5 6
The appellate court noted that although the Indiana Civil Rights
Law does not define the term "employment," it does define the terms
"employer" and "employee" and the term employment must be considered within the context of those definitions.57 Although the law firm
in this case satisfied the definition of employer because it employed six
or more persons, the complainant attorney was not an employee because
he did not receive wages or salary as required by the statutory definition;
he received a portion of the profits."
The relationship among partners in a law firm is not that of employer
and employee. Rather, the parties have equal status among themselves;
a partnership is an arrangement among equals.5 9 The court cited to the

Supreme Court's discussion in Hishon v. King Spalding0 regarding partnership status within the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Noting that the decision was not binding on the court in its
interpretation of Indiana law, the court found the analysis in Justice
Powell's concurring opinion helpful: "The relationship among law partners differs markedly from that between employer and employee....
The judgmental and sensitive decisions that must be made among the
partners embrace a wide range of subjects. The essence of the law
partnership is the common conduct of a shared enterprise." 61
C. Public Sector Employment
In Indiana State Prison v. Van Ulzen6 the Indiana Supreme Court
interpreted a provision in the State Personnel Act 63 governing demotions
of state employees. The provision states that any change of an employee
from a position in one class to a position in a lower ranking class is

56. Kightlinger & Gray, 567 N.E.2d at 130.
57. Id. at 129.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
61. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Kightlinger & Gray, 567 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ind
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
62. 582 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 1991).
63. IND. CoDE §§ 4-15-2-1 to -43 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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a demotion and can be made only in accordance with prescribed procedures."
The appellee, Van Ulzen, was a teacher at the Indiana State Prison.
On occasions when prison authorities instituted lockdowns, during which
no classes were held, Van Ulzen was temporarily reassigned to perform
certain correctional officer duties. Van Ulzen argued that this reassignment constituted a demotion because a correctional officer's job is of
a lower rank than a teacher and that the demotion violated state law
because it was accomplished without following the prescribed statutory
procedures.
Although Van Ulzen lost before the State Employees Appeals Commission, both the circuit and appellate courts endorsed his argument.
On transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, however, the court looked
beyond the narrow confines of section 24 of the State Personnel Act
governing demotions. The court began its analysis by noting that, with65
limited exceptions, no one has a right to continued public employment.
It then cited to that section of the State Personnel Act which allows
the employer to layoff employees for lack of work."6 Accordingly, the
warden could have laid off Van Ulzen during the lockdown because
there was no teaching work; the fact that Van Ulzen was temporarily
reassigned instead did not mean he was demoted. 6 Although acknowledging that the language of section 24 states that "any change" in
position to a lower-ranking class constitutes a demotion, the court concluded that the legislature could not have intended to create
a system
6
so inflexible as to preclude such temporary reassignments. 1
The court supported its conclusion by referring to section 34 of the
Personnel Act which sets forth the procedures which must be followed
before demoting an employee. 69 The same section governs procedures
for dismissal. The court found that in requiring these procedural protections, the legislature had in mind changes in employment of a permanent nature-dismissals and demotions. 0 The concept of demotion
connotes a permanent change for disciplinary purposes accompanied by
a cut in pay. Van Ulzen's reassignment was temporary, due to emergency
situations, and did not entail a reduction in pay. 71 Van Ulzen's temporary
reassignment, therefore, did not come within the purview of section 24
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

IND. CODE § 4-15-2-24 (1988).
Van Ulen, 582 N.E.2d at 791.
Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-2-32(a) (1988)).
Id. at 792.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 791 n.3 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-2-34 (West Supp. 1991)).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 791-92.
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dealing with demotions, and the prison acted lawfully. The court added,
"We are hard-pressed to imagine a situation where a modicum of
flexibility is more in order." 7 2
In another case dealing with state employees, the appellate court
interpreted Indiana Code chapter 4-15-3 dealing with the employment
73
of engineers by the state. In May v. Department of Natural Resources,
May claimed that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) lacked
the authority to demote him because DNR had failed to promulgate
rules and regulations concerning the employment of engineers as required
by Indiana Code sections 4-15-3-3 and 4-15-3-5. DNR responded that
these provisions are discretionary, not mandatory.
The court agreed with DNR. It noted that section 4-15-3-3 empowers
a department to promulgate rules "as it may deem proper." 7 4 This
language clearly indicates that such promulgation is within DNR's discretion.75 Section 4-15-3-5, however, states that each department "shall
cause to be prepared the rules and regulations. ' 7 6 Although the use of
the word "shall" is generally construed as mandatory, the context or
purpose of the statute may suggest a different meaning."
The court detailed circumstances in which the use of "shall" is held
to be directory and found that those circumstances applied to this statute.
First, the statute does not specify adverse consequences for failure to
promulgate the -rules. 7 Second, the promulgation of rules is not the
essence of this statute. 79 Rather, the essence of this statute is that
employment decisions regarding engineers be based on merit. Last, a
mandatory construction of "shall" in section 4-15-3-5 obviously conflicts
with the clearly discretionary provisions of section 4-15-3-3, and statutes
regarding the same subject matter are to be construed in pari materia.s0
Two other significant cases in the public sector employment area
dealt with questions arising under the Certificated Educational Employee
Bargaining Act (CEEBA).8 ' In Michigan City Education Association v.
Board of School Trustees,8 2 the court held that a teacher discharge
grievance cannot be subject to binding arbitration pursuant to a collective

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 792.
565 N.E.2d 367 (Ind Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
IND. CODE § 4-15-3-5 (1988).
May, 565 N.E.2d at 371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
577 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
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bargaining agreement between a school board and teachers' association.83
CEEBA places limits on the scope of collective bargaining between the
parties. Specifically, section 20-7.5-1-3 provides that a collective bargaining agreement cannot contain provisions in conflict with the school
employer's authority to discharge employees. 84 The responsibility regarding teacher dismissal was entrusted by the legislature solely to the
discretion of the school employer. The authority to decide this issue
cannot be delegated to an arbitrator. 85 The court noted that the employer
could contractually bind itself to follow specified criteria and procedures
relative to a dismissal decision, but that the decision itself could not be
86
contracted away.
In Coons v. Kaiser,"l a student sued schoolteachers who went on
strike, alleging that she had suffered educational deprivation and emotional distress as a result of the teachers' illegal actions. The court ruled
that the plaintiff lacked standing to enforce CEEBA's provisions prohibiting teacher strikes and that there was no common-law right of action
88
to recover damages for such a strike.
Section 20-7.5-1-14 of CEEBA not only prohibits strikes, but also
expressly provides who may bring an action to enforce the prohibition
and specifies the penalty imposed upon violators. 89 Only a school corporation or school employer is authorized to file suit for redress of an
illegal strike. Relying upon the general principle of statutory construction
that when a statute expressly provides a particular remedy the courts
should not expand its coverage, the court concluded that a private cause
of action could not be inferred.90
The court distinguished Boyle v. Anderson Fire FightersAssociation
Local 1262, 91 in which the court allowed private parties to maintain a
92
cause of action for damages caused by fire during a firefighters' strike.
The determinative factor in Boyle was the absence of a comprehensive
statute regulating strikes by firefighters. 93 The legislature has, however,
acted with regard to teacher strikes and specified enforcement procedures.
The plaintiff in Coons also argued that the teachers had committed
a common-law tort entitling her to common-law remedies. The court
disagreed, holding that a claim of educational deprivation is not an
83. Id. at 1008.
84. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1988).
85. Michigan City Educ. Ass'n, 577 N.E.2d at 1006-07.
86. Id. at 1008.
87.

567 N.E.2d 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.at 852-55.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-14 (1988).
Coons, 567 N.E.2d at 852.
497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
Id.at 1083.
Coons v. Kaiser, 567 N.E.2d 851, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
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established tort and should not be recognized independent of legislation.9
D.

Wage Statutes

In Osler Institute, Inc. v. Inglert,95 the Indiana Supreme Court
determined the circumstances under which an employee qualifies for
liquidated damages when the employer violates the Indiana wage payment
statute.9 Employee Inglert was terminated from employment by the Osler
Institute, but the employer failed to pay her overtime and vacation pay
within the period of time required by the wage payment statute. The
employer argued that it was not liable for liquidated damages because
Inglert had not requested the overtime and vacation pay prior to or
concurrent with her employment as required by the statute and that the
application of the penalty provision was dependant on such a request.
The appellate court rejected the employer's contention, holding that
because the employee had been terminated, it was not necessary for her
to demand, during her employment, payment of wages due as of her
termination. The court noted that the statute has three distinct requirements regarding wage payments, violation of any one of which subjects
the employer to the penalty provisions. One of the requirements is that
employees, upon termination of employment, are to be paid at the next
regular pay period. The court found that a demand for such payment
is not a prerequisite under this provision. Moreover, to hold otherwise
would allow employers to terminate employees, refuse payment of wages
due, and avoid the application of a penalty.
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate
court awarding liquidated damages and attorney's fees.9 It expressly
agreed with the rationale of the appellate court and noted that the court's
interpretation was consistent with Indiana Code section 22-2-9-2, which
provides that upon discharge of an employee, wages are due at the next
regular pay period. 9 Additionally, to the extent that the court in City
of Hammond v. Conley" held that a request was a prerequisite for the
penalty provision, it was overruled.1°°

94. Id. at 854.
95. 569 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. 1991) (per curiam).
96. Indiana Code § 22-2-5-1(a) requires that employers pay employees at least semimonthly or bi-weekly, if requested. Indiana Code § 22-2-5-2 provides that if an employer
fails to make payments as required by section 1, the employer is liable for liquidated
damages and attorney's fees.
97. Osler, 569 N.E.2d at 637.
98. Id.
99. 498 N.E.2d 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
100. Osler Inst., Inc. v. Inglert, 569 N.E.2d 636, 637 (Ind. 1991) (per curiam).
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In Stampco Construction Co. v. Guffey,10 the court dealt with
several issues concerning the enforcement and application of both the
Indiana and federal prevailing wage statutes. 0 2 The initial issue presented
was whether the statutes allow private causes of action. Neither statute
expressly authorizes private enforcement; thus, the question was whether
a private cause of action could be implied. Although noting that the
federal courts of appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits had answered
that question in the negative, the Stampco court elected to follow the
Seventh Circuit's decision in McDaniel v. University of Chicago,'03 which
found an implied private cause of action.1°4 The court, relying upon
McDaniel, held that a private cause of action exists under the federal
statute and adopted the McDaniel analysis to find that the Indiana
statute also implies a private cause of action. 05
The McDaniel court's analysis was based on an examination of the
factors proposed by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash' °6 for determining
whether a federal statute implies a private action. The key element of
the analysis in McDaniel was the decision that individual employees are
members of the class for whose special benefit the Davis Bacon statute
was enacted. 07
A cogent dissent by Judge Buchanan to the court's holding in
Stampco pointed out that the validity of the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in McDaniel had been undercut by subsequent Supreme Court cases
clarifying the factors for implying a private cause of action. 08 Judge
Buchanan cited Cannon v. University of Chicago,1 9 in which the Court
held that, in answering the question whether the plaintiff belonged to
the class of individuals for whose benefit the statute was passed, the
courts should look to the language of the statute."10 Judge Buchanan
also pointed to Universities Research Association, Inc. v. Coutu,", in
which the Court used the Cannon analysis in deciding whether an
employee has a private cause of action under Davis Bacon when the
underlying contract does not contain a prevailing wage clause. Although
101. 572 N.E.2d 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
102. See 40 U.S.C. § 2762 (1988); IND. CODE §§ 5-16-7-1 to -5 (1988 & Supp.
1991). Both statutes require, inter alia, the payment of prevailing wages to employees on
public works projects.
103. 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
104. Stampco, 572 N.E.2d at 512.
105. Id.at 512-13.
106. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
107. See Stampco Constr. Co. v. Guffey, 572 N.E.2d 510, 512 (Ind. Ct. App.

1991).
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 514-15 (Buchanan, J., dissenting).
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Id.at 689.
450 U.S. 754 (1981).
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noting that employees are the focus of the statute for whose benefit
prevailing wages are required, the Court found that the language of the
statute is directed to federal agencies, requiring them to place wage
clauses in federal construction contracts." 2 Therefore, the language of
Davis Bacon was not found to support a private cause of action under
the circumstances presented."'
Judge Buchanan noted in his dissent that the Coutu Court limited
its holding to the facts of the case and did not reach the broader question4
of whether Davis Bacon creates an implied right of action in any case."1
However, using the Cannon and Coutu analysis, Judge Buchanan found
that the language of Davis Bacon does not imply a private cause of
action." 5 The Stampco majority responded to Judge Buchanan's concerns
by stating that the court in Coutu "expressly refused to decide whether
the act created an implied private right of action to enforce a contract
that contained specific Davis Bacon stipulations."" 6
Having found that the McDaniel analysis was no longer viable, Judge
Buchanan refused to rely upon it in determining whether the Indiana
prevailing wage statute created a private cause of action. Using the Coutu
analysis, Buchanan noted that the Indiana statute directs government
agencies to require contractors to pay the prevailing wage; thus, the7
language does not indicate an intent to create a private cause of action."
Judge Buchanan found support for his conclusion in the fact that the
Indiana statute provides criminal penalties for its violation, alluding to
the discussion in Cort suggesting that the existence of criminal penalties
is an indication that the legislature did not intend civil enforcement.,
The second issue the Stampco court confronted concerned the validity
of waivers signed by employees agreeing to wages lower than those
required by the prevailing wage statutes." 9 The court noted the public
interest in not unnecessarily restricting freedom of contract, but emphasized that the prevailing wage statutes embody a public interest in
protecting employees from substandard wages. 120 The court relied on the
general rule that contracts violative of statutory rights are presumed
void, as well as on a finding that such a contract waiver would also

112. Id.at 770.
113. Id. at 772-73.
114. Stampco Constr. Co. v. Guffey, 572 N.E.2d 510, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)

(Buchanan, J., dissenting).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

516 (Buchanan, J., dissenting).
512 n.4.
516 (Buchanan, J., dissenting).
513.
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violate public policy. Accordingly, the waivers were void and unenforceable." 21
The court also found that because employees cannot waive their
right to prevailing wages, a release signed by an employee for any unpaid
wages is likewise void. 2 On this latter point, Judge Buchanan again
dissented. While agreeing that employees cannot waive their right to
receive prevailing wages, he considered a release signed after employment
had been terminated and a cause of action had accrued as involving a
substantially different circumstance.-2 The judge found no public policy
against the settlement of claims and viewed a release in return for some
consideration as a legitimate surrender of a right to pursue a cause of
action. 24
E. Unemployment Compensation
Several 1991 cases involved procedural issues arising in unemployment
compensation cases, while one case resolved a constitutional challenge
to a provision in the unemployment compensation statute.
In Stoner v. Review Board,-5 the Indiana Supreme Court considered
the scope of review of a Review Board decision. An employee was
discharged for using abusive language in referring to another employee.
The Board denied the employee's claim, finding just cause for discharge
based on the language used and on the fact that the employee failed
to use the proper channels in dealing with the problem which had
provoked his use of abusive language. The court of appeals reversed
the Board's decision because it was based in part on a reason, failure
to use proper channels, which was not the stated grounds for discharge.
The supreme court disagreed, holding that so long as the Board's
decision was sustainable on any theory it could not be set aside." 6 The
Board found abusive language had been used and relied upon that fact
in making its decision. The fact that the Board also made extraneous
conclusions did not invalidate the decision. 27 As Justice DeBruler pointed
out in his dissent, however, one cannot tell if the Board's finding that
the employee failed to use proper channels was extraneous because the
Board relied on that finding, as well as the abusive language, to deny
benefits.- 8 It was unclear whether use of abusive language alone would

121.

Id.

122. Id.
123. Id. at 517 (Buchanan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 516-17.
125. 571 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. 1991).
126. Id. at 297.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 298 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
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have been sufficient to deny benefits and thus, Justice DeBruler would
have remanded the case to the Board to decide that issue. 29
30
the court held that the 1990 decision
In Watterson v. Review Board,1
3
in Blackwell v. Review Board ' could be applied retroactively.' 32 Blackwell
addressed the type of proof necessary to support a finding that an
employer rule is reasonable and uniformly enforced as a prerequisite to
finding just cause when the employee violates such a rule. The Blackwell
court held that, absent stipulation, the employer's rule must be reduced
to writing and introduced in evidence in order for the employer to satisfy
its evidentiary burden 33 Oral testimony regarding the rule is insufficient. 34 The Watterson court found that this requirement did not change
the law, but merely clarified what type of evidence is sufficient to satisfy
the employer's burden. 35 Therefore, it could be applied retroactively.
Best Lock Corp. v. Review Board 36 also involved the evidentiary
standard of proof regarding the reasonableness of an employer rule,
violation of which is sufficient to constitute just cause. The employer
rule in question prohibited the off-duty use of tobacco and alcohol. The
employee was discharged for drinking alcohol on his own time. The
employer introduced the written rule into evidence 37 and proved that it
had been uniformly enforced. The point of contention was whether such
a rule was reasonable.
The court held that the burden was on the employer to establish
the reasonableness of its rule. 3 1 When a rule regulates off-duty conduct,
the employer must show that the activity sought to be regulated bears
some reasonable relationship to an employer business interest. 13 9 The
court cited a Wisconsin case, Gregory v. Anderson,' 40 as an example of
when an employer made such a showing. In Gregory, the employer's
business involved selling and servicing vending machines located in taverns. The employer had difficulty obtaining insurance for his drivers,
but the existence of a rule prohibiting all use of alcohol by his drivers
played a decisive factor in obtaining coverage. The employer's rule,

129. Id.
130. 568 N.E.2d 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
131. 560 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).

132.

Watterson, 568 N.E.2d at 1105.

133. Blackwell, 560 N.E.2d at 679.

134. Id.
135. Watterson v. Review Bd., 568 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
136. 572 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
137. The employer thereby satisfied the Blackwell requirement.

138. Best Lock, 572 N.E.2d at 527.
139. Id. at 525.
140.

109 N.W.2d 675 (Wis. 1961).
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therefore, was found to be reasonable. 4 In the instant case, however,
Best Lock failed to produce competent evidence to show any relationship
between the rule and its business interests; therefore, its rule was unreasonable, and violation of the rule did not constitute just cause for
42
purposes of denying unemployment benefits.'
43
In Vicari v. Review Board, the claimant alleged that the unemployment compensation statute violated the equal protection guarantee
in the Constitution because it treated claimants who had changed jobs
within ten weeks differently than claimants who had not changed jobs
within ten weeks. Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(c)(1) provides that if
an employee voluntarily leaves employment to accept a better job, she
will not be disqualified from receiving benefits if terminated from the
second job after a minimum of ten weeks of employment. 144 The court
found no equal protection violation because the ten week rule was
rationally related to a legitimate government objective-it 4prevents excessive job hopping and encourages employment stability. 1
F.

Workers' Compensation

The court in Artz v. Board of Commissioners'46 was asked to decide
if the workers' compensation law applies to county police officers. The
47
court determined that the officers are not excluded from coverage.
The county argued that Indiana Code section 22-3-2-2(c)(1), which excludes municipal corporation police officers who are members of a
pension fund, was intended to exclude any police officer who is eligible
for a death benefit under a pension plan. The court rejected this argument, noting that if the legislature's intent had been to prevent multiple
coverage it could have drafted the provision to say so.'" Secondly, the
language of the statute specifically uses the terms "common council"
and "city," indicating an intent to limit the exclusion to cities. 149 Lastly,
the legislature could not have intended to exclude county police officers
because when this section of the law was passed county police forces
did not exist. 50

141. Best Lock Corp. v. Review Bd., 572 N.E.2d 520, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Gregory v. Anderson, 109 N.W.2d 675 (Wis. 1961)).
142. Id. at 527.
143. 568 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
144. IND. CODE § 22-4-15-1(c)(1) (Supp. 1991).
145. Vicari, 568 N.E.2d at 1063.
146. 566 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
147.

Id. at 1106.

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Union City Body Co. v. Lambdin 5l involved determining the "date
of occurrence" under the Evans rule for purposes of deciding when the
statute of limitations for filing a claim begins to run. The Indiana
Supreme Court, in Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp., 52 held that a
compensable accident does not require a specific identifiable event, but
could be the result of the usual exertion or exposure of an employee's
job."' In Lambdin, the employee gradually became permanently disabled
as a result of the bending and lifting he performed on the job over a
period of years. Although the injury was compensable under Evans, the
employer argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations

because some of the events causing the injury occurred more than two
years before the claim was filed. The court rejected the argument. It
acknowledged that the limitations period begins to run from the date
of the occurrence, but noted that in an Evans-type case, the occurrence
is a continuing one.'1 4 When a continuing wrong exists, the statute of
limitations begins to run when permanence of the wrong is discernible. 5
Tarr v. Jablonski15 6 dealt with the exclusivity provision of the workers'
compensation statute. An employee experienced chest pains while at
work. Paramedics from the company medical department administered
emergency medical care, but the employee died of cardiac arrest. The
employee's survivors instituted a civil action for wrongful death against
the paramedics. The court found the cause of action barred by the
exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute. 57
The court initially noted the general rule that an individual covered
by workers' compensation cannot maintain a civil action against coemployees for injuries arising out of employment.' 58 The survivors argued
for an exception to the rule based on Ross v. Schubert,'59 in which the
court allowed an employee to sue a physician for malpractice even though
the physician was employed by their common employer at the plant
clinic. The court in Tarr refused to extend the Ross exception to paramedics for three reasons. First, Ross relied substantially on a case holding
that a corporation cannot be held liable for physician malpractice, which
holding is no longer viable. Second, the court cited Rodgers v. Hembd,1'6

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

569 N.E.2d 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
491 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1986).
Id. at 973.
Union City, 569 N.E.2d at 374.
Id.
569 N.E.2d 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 379-80.
Id. at 379.
388 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
518 N.E.2d 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
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in which the court refused to apply Ross to nonmedical professionals.
Third, the Tarr court distinguished Ross as involving a doctor required
to exercise independent professional judgment, whereas paramedics have
6
no such responsibility, but are required to follow written protocol.' '

161. Tarr v. Jablonski, 569 N.E.2d 378, 379-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). The worker's
compensation claim which the survivors filed against the employer was also denied for
failure to prove that the employee's death was caused by the paramedics; therefore, the
employee's death did not arise "out of employment." Jablonski v. Inland Steel Co., 575
N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

